On Induction and the Empirical Sciences

The epistemological core of the discussion on induction and its role in the methodology of the empirical sciences may be summarised in a very simple question: is the principle of induction the basis of modern empirical sciences, and should it be or, having been questioned since the time of Hume in the 18th century, is it practically discredited today, having been defeated by the criticisms of Popper and by Hempel’s paradox?

The concept of induction (the kind of reasoning that leads us to draw general conclusions or make predictions concerning unobserved cases based on cases we have observed) has a long tradition in philosophy, which is worth revisiting.

Aristotle was the first to concern himself systematically with induction and he gave it a foundation based on the whole of his metaphysics, that is, what he thought concerning the nature of reality and knowledge. For Aristotle, scientific knowledge was essentially a system of classification. In a world of beings which organise themselves and rank themselves according to unchangeable forms or essences, a scientific statement confirms that an individual belongs to a certain species or that a certain species belongs to a genus. The individual is the specific case, the particular; stating that he belongs to a species defines his essence and shows what is universal in him.

According to Aristotle, the universal elements, the essences, exist in things, in particulars. Induction (in-ducere, to lead inward) consists precisely in this recognition of the concept (the universal) within the sensible (the particular). As we observe the behaviour of a phenomenon in various particular cases and recognize a regular pattern, we are naturally led to infer that this regular behaviour is a sign of the essence of the phenomenon and to forecast that the same behaviour will be shown in cases which will be observed in the future. This is basically the way in which Aristotle understands and justifies induction. 

After 2000 years of almost complete dominance, Aristotle’s metaphysical ideas were challenged by modern philosophy. Hume, in particular, rejected Aristotelian essentialism, thus undermining the basis of induction. The link between particular cases and general law no longer depends on the presence of the universal within the thing and comes to be seen as simply the result of subjective expectation based on habit. This does not imply that Hume rejects or undervalues induction as a resource to be used in daily life or in empirical science: he simply removes the claim that knowledge obtained through it has an absolute, unquestionable metaphysical truth.

Hume’s criticism of Aristotle’s theory of induction did not prevent logical empiricism, the dominant concept in the philosophy of science until the 1950s, from defending an inductivist view of scientific method. It was felt that the general laws of empirical sciences were obtained through induction from the observation of specific cases, thus consisting in a simple summary or ‘condensation’ of concrete experience. As well as being acquired by induction, for the logical empiricists general laws could also be proved inductively. The greater the number of positive examples (specific cases conforming to the law) that could be observed, the greater would be the level of confirmation of the law or hypothesis. Actually, laws were only hypotheses with a sufficiently high degree of confirmation. The idea of the degree of confirmation led to attempts to apply calculations of probability to this discussion, but without any great success.

The discrediting of the inductive conception of scientific method was to a great extent the work of Popper. Proper claimed to have solved the problem of induction in a new and radical way: simply showing that the problem of induction does not exist in empirical science for the good reason that empirical science is not inductive. Scientific hypotheses are not obtained by inductive generalisation nor are they proved by the repetition of positive cases. Science moves forward by conjecture (bold generalisations with no logical support from experience) and refutations. What strengthens our hypotheses is their resistance to the clever and honest attempts to refute them to which they are subjected and that they manage to survive. Popper calls this process corroboration. 

Searle on university education

This text of the Berkeley philosopher John Searle, written 21 years ago, is still totally up to date - alas!

http://www.ditext.com/searle/searle1.html

The Storm Over the University (December 6, 1990)

The New York Review of Books

I cannot recall a time when American education was not in a "crisis." We have lived through Sputnik (when we were "falling behind the Russians"), through the era of "Johnny can't read," and through the upheavals of the Sixties. Now a good many books are telling us that the university is going to hell in several different directions at once. I believe that, at least in part, the crisis rhetoric has a structural explanation: since we do not have a national consensus on what success in higher education would consist of, no matter what happens, some sizable part of the population is going to regard the situation as a disaster. As with taxation and relations between the sexes, higher education is essentially and continuously contested territory. Given the history of that crisis rhetoric, one's natural response to the current cries of desperation might reasonably be one of boredom.

-        The student should have enough knowledge of his or her cultural tradition to know how it got to be the way it is. This involves both political and social history, on the one hand, as well as the mastery of some of the great philosophical and literary texts of the culture on the other. It involves reading not only texts that are of great value, like those of Plato, but many less valuable that have been influential, such as the works of Marx. For the United States, the dominant tradition is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain the European tradition. The United States is, after all, a product of the European Enlightenment. However, you do not understand your own tradition if you do not see it in relation to others. Works from other cultural traditions need to be studied as well.

-        You need to know enough of the natural sciences so that you are not a stranger in the world.

-        You need to know at least one foreign language well enough so that you can read the best literature that that language has produced in the original, and so you carry on a reasonable conversation and have dreams in that language. There are several reasons why this is crucial, but the most important is perhaps this: you can never understand one language until you understand at least two.

-        You need to know enough philosophy so that the methods of logical analysis are available to you to be used as a tool. One of the most depressing things about educated people today is that so few of them, even among professional intellectuals, are able to follow the steps of a simple logical argument.

-        Finally, and perhaps most importantly, you need to acquire the skills of writing and speaking that make for candor, rigor, and clarity. You cannot think clearly if you cannot speak and write clearly.

-        Just acquiring this amount of "education" will not, by itself, make you an educated person, even less will it give you what Oakeshott calls "judgment." But if the manner of instruction is adequate, the student should be able to acquire this much knowledge in a way that combines intellectual openness, critical scrutiny, and logical clarity. If so, learning will not stop when the student leaves the university.

See also: The Campus War (1971)

Promise or Terror?

Goya - O sono da Razão

Can it be that what seems to be happening in Brazil and in much of the world – the so-called ‘crisis of representation’, the distrust of institutions – may be a sign that ‘the masses’ are feeling that within the political rationality of capitalism and the rules of representative democracy they do not have and will not find their opportunity?

In his study of religions Max Weber notes existence in societies of a cycle that revolves between two basic forms of religion: religions of salvation - which aim at a transcendental goal by means of prophecies and charismatic leaders - and religions of acceptance, which encourage man to adapt to the world by means of rules and rituals.  The first type have the potential to cause revolution insofar as they aim at changing the world, or at least not accepting its reality and laws as supreme values. 

According to Weber a similar pattern is found in terms of the Law: a progression from traditional societies ruled by the sacred to the law of lawyers which is rational and impersonal.

Equally, in economics the universal rules of the marketplace have come to take precedence over previous economic regulations based on custom or religion.  We cannot say that the laws of the marketplace are unfair: the ‘injustices’ (acts of partiality or exclusion) that mark the differences between ‘classes’ arise out of rational rules (that are general and valid for all) and not from tradition such as the privileges of ‘castes’.